David Goldman continues to insist that all is under control. See my previous discussion in Random Observations. That is, he insists that current debt and especially sovereign debt problems will not cause another crisis like that of 2008:
More drivel has been written about the probability of financial crisis during the past month than at any time during my lifetime. There’s no crisis–not when all of the problems are transparent, on the table, and subject to negotiation. Instead, there is a change in lifestyle underway for Greek railway conductors, Minnesota firemen, New York City teachers, and a great many other people. Folk who only a few years ago expected to retire at sixty and spend their golden years on cruises will work until seventy and be thankful for a roof over their heads. See Not a Crisis, But a Negotiation
Goldman’s crisis avoidance stands on the following pillars:
- The problems are known.
- Because the problems are known they can be negotiated away.
- Since the financial system has reduced its leverage, a crash cannot occur. Why? Because leveraging leads to sales of assets at distressed prices in a crisis.
- If the US suffers a downgrade, the Federal Reserve and Treasury can easily implement financial maneuvers to work around the downgrade.
- Finally, we have reduced complex, structured investment vehicles.
Risks We Knew, and Ignored, in the Last Decade
We knew about the overheating housing market and reckless subprime lending for several years before the crash of 2008. We knew about the problem of excess leverage in the system. (In fact, the Federal Reserve relaxed leverage requirements, allowing firms like Lehman, Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs to leverage 30-1 to 40-1). Ben Bernanke claimed that the subprime crisis was “well contained” and would not affect the overall residential housing market.
None of these known problems could be “negotiated away.” The financial system indeed seized up and nearly ended in total system breakdown.
What are the Current Risks?
Do we really know the current problems? Last week, Bank of America wrote off $19.2b in bad loans. Besieged by lawsuits and an unrecovered housing market, Bank of America can no longer hide behind “extend and pretend” fictional accounting.
…the bank appears to be in denial:
The crucial question today is whether Bank of America needs fresh capital to strengthen its balance sheet. Moynihan emphatically says it doesn’t, pointing to regulatory-capital measures that would have us believe it’s doing fine. The market is screaming otherwise, judging by the mammoth discount to book value. Then again, for all we know, the equity markets might not be receptive to a massive offering of new shares anyway, even if the bank’s executives were inclined to try for one.
Weil correctly depicts BofA as a systemic risk. See Is Bank America at Risk of a Death Spiral?
And Bank of America is not the only “too big to fail” American bank:
And let us tell you a dirty secret: while Bank of America, thanks to Countrywide, is patient zero of the housing mess, Wells is next in line. Residential real estate is proportionately even bigger relative to the bank’s earnings and balance sheet, its accounting has been somewhere between aggressive and misleading, and despite its pious claims otherwise, it is no better than any of the other big banks. Stay tuned. See Is Bank America at Risk of a Death Spiral?
Both Wells Fargo and Bank of America are large, publicly held corporations subject to scrupulous reporting requirements. Nevertheless, large, unpleasant surprises appear seemingly out of nowhere. Goldman misses the point, that future financial crises are in plain sight and we seem incapable of dealing with them. The interconnectedness of credit default swaps makes these banks even riskier. How can we gauge the effect on these banks of a crisis in Greek, Italian or other sovereign debt?
Being dismissive of the plight of highly paid Minnesota firemen and New York City teachers incorrectly trivializes their key role in any future financial crisis. The fireman and teacher are both current and future homeowners. They are also consumers. The financial world ultimately comes down to discounted future cash flows. Cut the income of enough highly paid workers and suddenly future corporate, governmental and individual cash flows do not look so rosy. Moreover, this scenario keeps the housing market under pressure assuring future damage to bank balance sheets.
We need to stop denying our financially interconnected world. Goldman’s analysis makes two mistakes: it skips over the effect financial austerity will have on housing, banks and tax revenues, and it believes our government and financial leaders can solve crises, even crises that are well understood and “transparent.” The quagmire of our current debt level discussions only proves my point.
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