Posts Tagged: AIG


16
May 10

Surfing the Financial Crisis

I’ve been watching the financial crisis since it began in 2007.  Every so often it is good to step back and consider some of the anomalies. Thus, some disconnected thoughts:

-          The time between crises gets shorter.  It was seven years from the dot.com to the sub-prime crash.  It has taken us only one year from TARP and other alphabet soup US-based federal bailout programs to the European Commission trillion dollar bailout.  With the Euro plunging after the bailout, how long will it be to the next crisis?

-          If everything is really improving why have short-term US interest rates not risen? I am amazed that for over 2-years of regular Treasury auctions, 3 month bill rates have ranged between .1 – .2%.  Why does the Federal Reserve keep stating in its guidance that it intends to keep rates at zero for an extended period of time?

-          Why would anyone invest in the US equity markets?  The most active stocks each day are severely troubled, probably insolvent companies:  Citicorp, Fannie Mae, AIG, and Bank of America. More than sixty percent of every day’s volume is non-human, computerized, automated trading.  And what is worse, computers doing this trading are shaving cents off each transaction to the detriment of institutions and retail investors.   No one believes in long term investment value any more. Respected analysts believe the market is severely overvalued and should probably trade at the 850 S&P level.

-          How do Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan have perfect trading performance, that is, making money every day of the first quarter?  Karl Denninger has calculated the odds of achieving this feat at one in many trillions.  Have the SEC and other government regulators taken an extended holiday during the financial crisis? It sure seems that way.

-           The 1987 version of the SEC portrayed in the movie Wall Street was able to detect illegal activity in the fictional Blue Star Airlines and arrest the hapless Bud Fox.  Mary Schapiro and the current SEC staff can’t seem to find water with two hands if they fell out of a rowboat in the middle of the Atlantic.

-          Why do things keep getting more complicated and less clear? Yes, we live in a complex world.  But I have a deep suspicion that complexity is being used as a subterfuge to mask true intent.  Why do we need multi-thousand page financial and health reform legislation, customized credit default swap instruments and impenetrable corporate proxy statements? The answer: complexity is designed to disguise the essence of each issue.

-           Why is the Federal Reserve afraid of a full-fledged audit?   As taxpayers, we are the ultimate financiers for the various government bailout programs. What happened to sunshine as the best disinfectant in public matters?  This is an economic, not a national security matter. Or in the minds of the government, has everything become a national security matter, even the Fed’s purchase of the Red Roof Inn?

-          Why is Senator Chris Dodd, himself compromised with a Countrywide below market loan, allowed to lead financial reform?

-          With a Justice Department of 100,000 employees, why haven’t we indicted a major financial institution?

We live in dangerous times.  Perhaps some of our leaders should be thinking about some of these questions and issues.

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29
Apr 10

Some Random Thoughts on Goldman

Tuesday’s Senate hearings on Goldman raised as many issues as they answered.  Today’s thoughts on the status of Goldman Sachs’ current folly and the US financial industry:

-          Goldman executives have no idea how angry the average American is at Wall Street in general and Goldman in particular.

-          Nobody likes Ivy-league trained, arrogant, wise-cracking executives, least of all those who wear great suits and have great haircuts.

-          In a work-related email, lack of discretion and caution can really return to haunt the writer.  Thus, characterizing a deal as “shitty,” calling the securities “monstrosities,” doubting the sale of your product to “widows and orphans,” and not understanding the complexities of these products guarantees later problems to both writer and firm.

-          When pressed on the use of the word “shitty” in the email, the correct response is not that it was an unfortunate use of words.  Rather, explain whether or not it was a good or bad deal for the investors.

-          To the average American, trying to justify a $9 million cash compensation package as “modest” will never work.

-          If indeed the customer comes first at Goldman, it is impossible to duck questions on fiduciary duty to your customer.

-           “I did nothing legally wrong” will only antagonize the SEC and other prosecutors.  The court will decide what is lawful.

-          As a corollary point, isn’t Goldman smart enough to stop its ongoing public relations releases attacking the SEC and proclaiming innocence?  Nobody believes them.

I have made much of Wall Street’s casino atmosphere.   The Senate should now focus on the following:

  • Why are these types of securities even  legal?
  • What societal or economic good do they promote?
  • How did Goldman and other firms prosper through the short-selling of their competitors’ securities (e.g. AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman)
  • Even if a security is marginally legal, is it ethical to sell it to customers without detailed and comprehensive disclosures?
  • Since Goldman does not write mortgages, commercial loans or engage in other aspects of retail banking, why should it have a national bank charter?
  • Since it is really a disguised hedge fund, why should it be able to borrow at the Federal Reserve’s discount window at zero percent interest?
  • What is Goldman’s current level of leverage compared to leverage employed just prior to the financial crisis?
  • How could overuse of leverage cause a second more serious financial crisis?
  • Does Goldman (or any other firm) expect to be bailed out again if the crisis reappears?
  • What has Goldman done or approved to assure the public of no more tainted securities and no second bailout?   Personnel changes, managements controls, ethical standards, external oversight?

The press has given much coverage to these hearings.  It is now time for some thoughtful reflection on  Wall Street’s behavior: Is there excessive leverage? Favoring of certain financial institutions? Are we investing or gambling?  Have we learned any lessons? Where are the regulators?

For a public with a short attention span and a Senate looking for quick financial reform, it is handy to target Goldman.   Unfortunately, flogging their executives is merely peeling back one layer of the very large, smelly onion that Wall Street has become.

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19
Mar 10

Is the Administration Determined to Make the Elderly Poor?

We have created a handout and bailout society where every constituency earns a welfare payment. Here is a partial list from Obama world:

Bear Stearns 2008 – As the financial giant neared collapse, JP Morgan Chase and the federal government bailed out Bear Stearns. JP Morgan bought it for   $236 million and the Federal Reserve ensured the sale with a $30 billion credit line. Taxpayer cost – $30 billion

Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac 2008 – On Sep. 7, 2008, Fannie and Freddie were placed under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency; i.e. under the terms of the rescue, they were effectively nationalized. , The Treasury has invested billions to cover the companies’ losses. Initially, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson set an investment ceiling of $100 billion each.  In February, Tim Geithner raised that tab to $200 billion. While the money was authorized by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, by Executive Order we have unlimited taxpayer liability.  Taxpayer cost so far – $400 billion

American International Group (A.I.G.) 2008 - On four separate occasions, the government offered aid to AIG to keep it from collapsing, beginning with an $85 billion credit line from the Federal Reserve to a combined $180 billion between the Treasury ($70 billion) and Fed ($110 billion). $40 billion of this Treasury commitment is also included in the TARP total. Taxpayer cost – $180 billion

Auto Industry 2008 – In late September 2008, Congress approved a more than $630 billion spending bill, which included a measure for $25 billion in auto industry loans. These low-interest loans are primarily intended to aid the Detroit Big Three (GM, Ford, Chrysler) in their push to build more fuel-efficient, environmentally-friendly vehicles.  Taxpayer cost – to be determined.

See History of US Gov’t Bailouts

In addition to the bailouts, economic stimulus measures purportedly saved millions of public and private sector jobs.  For those workers not “saved” by Obama’s stimulus measures, Congress extended unemployment benefits.

Punishing the Elderly

One significant group has not benefitted from Obama’s ubiquitous fiscal largesse.  A consequence of Administration policy is the growing impoverishment of the American elderly.   Let’s examine Bernanke’s and Geithner’s handiwork:

  • Interest rate Policy – Zero interest rate policies penalize the elderly.  After a lifetime of savings the elderly may be lucky to earn one percent on their savings.  Of course, they are welcome to gamble in the stock market casino.  Unfortunately the last ten years have shown no return on stock market investments and the public has been traumatized by two major bear markets.
  • Social Security Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) – The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) massaged COLAs to penalize the elderly.  John Williams at shadowstats.com has consistently pointed out how the Bureau has tortured the consumer price index to avoid reflecting its actual upward movement. Mr. Williams estimates that the effective annual consumer price index (CPI) has risen 9.76% v. the BLS-reported 2.63%.See Protecting Profits from the Apparent Recovery
  • Health Care – Medicare reimbursements to physicians have been cut 21%.  This will compromise the quality and availability of medical care.
  • Employment – Given the high levels of unemployment and meager job growth, the elderly have limited opportunities to reenter the workforce.

The Non-Barking Dog?

Are the elderly the new silent majority? Where are the militant Gray Panthers of yester year? The strangely quiet AARP and the elderly should be bombarding Congress with emails and letters publicizing their plight.

Are the elderly the dogs that don’t bark? They should be howling right now! And by the way, the elderly do vote. In key states like Florida, Texas, Arizona and California they are powerful constituencies.

With excesses like the above, the elderly and almost elderly should be barking like crazy.  And with their votes and voices, these aging children of the sixties know how to bite as well.

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19
Feb 10

A Reputation as Good as Goldman Part II

In A Reputation as Good as Goldman Part I, we examined Goldman’s role in exacerbating the housing market collapse, AIG’s demise, and the Greek government debt crisis.  These major stories were the subject of separate front page articles in the New York Times. Mentors had always warned me no to be too clever by half, a lesson Goldman perhaps missed.   Are the Goldman stories symptomatic of behavior for the last ten years on Wall Street?  Was this always the way Wall Street firms and Goldman behaved?

Sydney Weinberg

In 1930, Sydney Weinberg became the head of Goldman Sachs. He ran the firm for the next 39 years.  By 2010 standards, he was an unlikely person for the job. He had left school at 15 (1907) and started at the struggling brokerage firm as a janitor’s assistant.  He then served in the Navy during World War I, returned to the firm and ultimately became co-head of the securities trading group. He is credited with saving Goldman Sachs from bankruptcy during the Depression. See Annals of Business: The Uses of Adversity by Malcolm Gladwell

In 1956, Weinberg managed his greatest corporate coup. Goldman Sachs was selected to handle for the Ford Motor Company the enormously difficult, largest ever until that time, initial public offering.  The effort took two years. The most fascinating part of the transaction was Weinberg’s fee:

When Henry Ford had asked Weinberg at the outset what his fee would be, Weinberg had declined to get specific; he offered to work for a dollar a year until everything was over and then let the family decide what his efforts were really worth.  Far more than the actual fee, Weinberg always said he appreciated an affectionate, handwritten letter he received from Ford which says, along with other flattering things, “Without you, it could not have been accomplished.” Weinberg had the letter framed and hung in his office, where he would proudly direct visitors’ attention to it, saying: “That’s the big payoff as far as I am concerned…” The fee finally paid was estimated at the time to be as high as a million dollars. The actual fee was nowhere near that amount: For two years’ work and a dazzling success, the indispensable man was paid only $250,000. Deeply disappointed, Sidney Weinberg never mentioned the amount.  See The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs by Charles D. Ellis.

Weinberg understood the value of a continuing relationship with Ford Motor Company and was soon appointed to their board.  Moreover, for nearly a half century, Goldman became the chief investment bank for Ford which vaulted the firm into the top tier of Wall Street firms.  To Sydney Weinberg reputation was everything.

Tradition and the Making of a Culture

John Weinberg followed his father Sidney as head of the firm.  The younger Weinberg preserved his father’s ethic and corporate culture.

Once upon a time, Goldman Sachs shunned publicity.  During the period from 1930 to 1969, Sydney Weinberg ran Goldman Sachs where he developed a staunch corporate cultural aversion to publicity.  During the 1970s, a tandem of John Weinberg and John Whitehead assumed the reigns of leadership at Goldman Sachs.  Whitehead left the company in 1984 to enter public life.  John Weinberg carried on in the same vein as his father Sydney – shunning publicity – to the point where he hired a man to keep his name and his firm’s out of the press.  He kept him off the full-time payroll (though he sat full-time at a desk in head office) so that if, improbably, a comment did slip out, it could be honestly dismissed as not coming from a Goldman Sachs employee.  John Weinberg served as sole senior partner and chairman until 1990.  His mantra was to put the client’s interests first and he wouldn’t allow Goldman to be involved in (sic) hostile takeovers. See All Roads Lead to Goldman Sachs.

As a young law student, Ben Stein interviewed with John Weinberg.  He was impressed with Weinberg as a “smart guy,” but also surmised that he inherited the position from his father, Sydney Weinberg:

But what I did not know about John Weinberg was that even though he was rich and well connected, as a young man he joined the Marines to fight the Japanese in the Pacific, then fought again in Korea. That was America’s ruling class then. The scions of the rich went off to fight. See Looking for the Will Beyond the Battlefield

Clearly, John Weinberg believed that honor and service to one’s country mattered.  But in the current Goldman and Wall Street culture, going off to serve one’s country is for the common folk: why do that and miss out on so many deals and great bonuses?

What Changed?

The end of the Weinbergs’ era can be traced to several factors.  First, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and other large investment firms were partnerships.  This means the partners were investing their personal fortunes.  Moreover, retained capital was extremely important to the future success of the business.  Thus, there was a limit on executive compensation based on capital and personal preservation.  Second, as firms went public, it was easier to convince a less involved board of directors (rather than partners) to pay large bonuses to executives. Third, those same executives became increasingly greedy, and probed and trampled ethical boundaries. Short-term thinking reigned on Wall Street.  Fourth, compliant government officials endorsed and enabled these behaviors instead of regulating them.

Finally, we need to look at the important intersection of law and ethics.  Just because something is legal does not mean one should do it.  A legal thing is not always an ethical thing.  Would the Weinbergs’ have permitted Goldman to take positions against their own clients?   Would they have forced AIG into insolvency? Would they have designed scams to fool the EU? I doubt it.

It will be a long time before Goldman restores its reputation.  And President Obama is not catalyzing any restoration of ethics or reputation by calling the current Goldman CEO a savvy businessman.   By its actions, I doubt if Goldman Sachs cares.

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18
Feb 10

A Reputation as Good as Goldman? Part I

Part I of II in a series. Part II here.

“It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you’ll do things differently.”

Warren Buffett

Arguably the greatest living investor, Warren Buffet, clearly valued a person’s or an organization’s reputation.   In 2008 Buffet was the “white knight” investor for a struggling Goldman Sachs, investing $5b in the firm.  A mentor of mine had wise complementary counsel to Buffet’s:  when providing legal advice, be sure that you would be comfortable if that advice were to appear in a New York Times, Washington Post or Wall Street Journal front page article.

We live in  an age of greed, and indeed supreme irony.   Perhaps Mr. Buffet never shared his wise advice with the senior management of Goldman Sachs.  Worse, maybe he did and they ignored him.  In any event, how has Goldman’s reputation fared?  Let’s examine three separate front page New York Times articles.

Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It And Won (NY Times, December 24, 2009)

Goldman Sachs sold mortgage-backed debt securities to pension funds and insurance companies. To hedge their position and to profit from a decline in the housing market, Goldman created a synthetic derivative security called Abacus. This second security was a direct bet against the position of their institutional clients. The mortgage-backed debt securities sold to the institutional clients performed poorly, with losses in the billions. Some of the original securities were of such poor quality that losses occurred within months of issue. Goldman created these synthetic securities well in excess of any hedging needs, permitting it to profit handsomely at the expense of its institutional clients.  The obvious ethical problem was succinctly stated:

“The simultaneous selling of securities to customers and shorting them because they believed they were going to default is the most cynical use of credit information that I have ever seen,” said Sylvain R. Raynes, an expert in structured finance at R & R Consulting in New York. “When you buy protection against an event that you have a hand in causing, you are buying fire insurance on someone else’s house and then committing arson.”

The SEC and other governmental agencies are investigating Goldman and other firms to determine whether or not they violated “fair dealing” rules.

Testy Conflict with Goldman Helped Push A.I.G. to Edge (NY Times, February 7, 2010)

AIG insured some of Goldman’s complex mortgage securities.  When the housing crisis deepened, AIG paid Goldman $2b to cover potential losses. AIG later asserted that Goldman had inflated the potential losses and sought monies back. Goldman countered that it was due even more money.  The SEC is now looking into whether or not Goldman’s demands for loss coverage depressed the mortgage market and hastened AIG’s demise.

In another supreme irony, after the government took over AIG, Goldman received an additional $12.9b from taxpayers, one hundred percent of expected losses.

Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis (NY Times, February 14, 2010)

Goldman’s questionable financial maneuvers were not confined to the United States.

As worries over Greece rattle world markets, records and interviews show that with Wall Street’s help, the nation engaged in a decade-long effort to skirt European debt limits. One deal created by Goldman Sachs helped obscure billions in debt from the budget overseers in Brussels.

Even as the crisis was nearing the flashpoint, banks were searching for ways to help Greece forestall the day of reckoning. In early November — three months before Athens became the epicenter of global financial anxiety — a team from Goldman Sachs arrived in the ancient city with a very modern proposition for a government struggling to pay its bills, according to two people who were briefed on the meeting.

The bankers, led by Goldman’s president, Gary D. Cohn, held out a financing instrument that would have pushed debt from Greece’s health care system far into the future, much as when strapped homeowners take out second mortgages to pay off their credit cards.

European authorities are looking into the role of Goldman and others in skirting EU rules.

Is There Another Way?

Has the American public been lulled into believing that this is an acceptable way of doing business, or do we require the people involved to be publicly excoriated, tried, convicted and jailed before we acknowledge their tactics were shabby?  Is Goldman Sachs an institution now synonymous with crafty machinations and greedy outcomes? Are its tactics symptomatic of a Wall Street “disease?”  Is there an alternative way of doing things?  Does reputation matter?  Part II will examine these issues and possibilities.

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2
Feb 10

Timothy Geithner and Plausible Deniability

Congressional hearings often make wonderful theater.  Last week at the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, the American public heard testimony from Timothy Geithner, former head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and now US Treasury Secretary and Henry Paulson, former US Treasury Secretary.  Both men’s testimony relied on one premise: if we did not bail out AIG and pay its counterparties 100 cents on the dollar, the financial world as we know it would have ended,  i.e., the US would have plunged into a second Great Depression.  By written statement, Fed Reserve chair Ben Bernanke informed the Committee of his full support for this decision.  In person, Henry Paulson agreed.  However, both men said they had nothing to do with the decision.  Further, Mr. Geithner testified that he had relied on his staff or details of the bailout.  And even further than that, he later distanced himself from the decision whether nor not to disclose the details of the bailout. America was treated to the concept of “plausible deniability.”

Plausible Deniability

Working in a corporation one gets a firsthand look at the concept of “plausible deniability.”  Plausible deniability works something like this: a crisis starts; an important decision must be made; a senior executive is charged with making a decision; the senior executive delegates much of the preparatory work to  staff or a trusted lieutenant; the staff or trusted lieutenant ultimately makes a recommendation which later becomes “The Decision. “  If or when something goes wrong in the future, the senior executive denies involvement and places the blame on the staff or the trusted lieutenant.  Almost every time, the superiors of the senior executive accept this scenario.  The senior executive survives.

Let’s Get Real

Harry Truman said “the buck stops here,” meaning that the most senior executive has ultimate responsibility for a decision.  Perhaps with President Clinton or at some time it became fashionable for the senior person to distance himself from the decision so that he would have plausible deniability.  Further, it was expected that subordinates would “throw themselves on their swords” to preserve their boss.

It stretches credulity that the three most senior financial executives in government, The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the President of the New York Federal Reserve and the Treasury Secretary did not know the intimate details of the AIG bailout.  At stake at the time was $62b of taxpayer money to effect this phase of the bailout.  All three men agree that if the bailout did not take place financial Armageddon would have ensued.

More is expected of our public servants. We appointed these individuals because of their unique skills, judgment and character. Apparently, these individuals were unavailable in the AIG crisis to make critical decisions.  Based on these stated actions, I deplore the confirmation of Ben Bernanke.  Moreover, I would ask for the resignation of Timothy Geithner.

It is time that high level government officials took responsibility and become the watchdog of the public purse. Trying to blame subordinates should elicit the response from the public: “that dog won’t hunt!”

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25
Jan 10

Freedom to Fail

In his 1941 State of the Union address, President Franklin Roosevelt articulated four iconic freedoms:

  • Freedom of speech
  • Freedom of religion
  • Freedom from want
  • Freedom from fear

In our current situation, capitalism needs a fifth freedom, the freedom to fail

The Systematic Destruction of the Freedom to Fail

In the 1950’s, Dr. Benjamin Spock’s child rearing advice focused on a child’s self-esteem rather than discipline, performance, success or accomplishment.  This emphasis correlated to a new and pervasive permissiveness which sought to prevent failure as a childhood experience rather than process it for personal growth when it inevitably occurs.  And so the advent of the “Lake Wobegon effect:”

where ‘all the women are strong, all the men are good looking, and all the children are above average,’ … used to describe a real and pervasive human tendency to overestimate one’s achievements and capabilities in relation to others. The Lake Wobegon effect, where all or nearly all of a group claim to be above average, has been observed among drivers, CEOs, stock market analysts, college students, parents, and state education officials, among others.

And so we coddled the Baby Boom Generation.  If our child failed a course, get a tutor.  If College Board scores were not high enough, enroll the child in a review course.  Everyone was entitled to a college education, a house and a good paying job. Originally, affirmative action was designed to overcome discrimination.  It morphed from its original intent, equality of opportunity, to equality of outcome.   In the corporate environment, one’s status (that is, minority, female, disabled among others) many times trumped one’s accomplishments. I am in favor of the original purpose of affirmative action, but not its wrong-headed incarnation.

The Financial Crisis and the Freedom to Fail

The government stepped into the breach to prevent major institutions– AIG, GE, American Express, Capital One, GM, Chrysler, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac– from failing.  In an economic analogy to Dr. Spock parenting, the Fed reacted as a permissive and nonjudgmental parent to a child eminently deserving of a failure experience from which to learn something.  By not permitting these institutions to fail, we may have exposed ourselves to much larger systemic failure with a default or devaluation of our currency.

Failure is Integral to Success

We should think about our own personal life paths.  Did we learn more from success or failure?  If we are honest with ourselves, we would admit that we learn much more from failure.  It builds resilience, humility and,  if we absorb the lessons, a path to success.  It is almost immoral to take away the ability to fail and learn.

Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian economist, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, theorized that “creative destruction” was integral to capitalism:

the same process of industrial mutation–if I may use that biological term–that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in. . . .

Failure is an excellent teacher.  Permitting smaller failures after the internet boom would have saved the country the anguish of millions of people losing their houses, the near destruction of our banking system and the collapse of the stock market.

Now the government would be prudent to permit business failures regardless of business size or political connections.  Sparing the rod of failure only spoils the childlike business with more reckless behavior.  Without the “hell” of failure, there can be no “heaven” of success.

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31
Dec 09

Shredding the Social Fabric

A continuing barrage of headlines reveals even more government bailouts of private enterprise:

  • GMAC received bailout funds of an additional $3.8b on top of $13.5. (See BBC News report)
  • The Obama Administration on Christmas Eve gave Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government sponsored enterprises, a “blank check.” Previously each of their bailout levels had been capped at $200b.  The New American reported that these two GSEs now have unlimited Treasury bailout funds until 2012.
  • After a fourth bailout this year, AIG received $180b from the Treasury.

Private enterprise awards of obscene amounts of money from the Treasury are indefensible.  No amount of government spin can mask this truth:  private businesses which made massive mistakes in lending and insurance practices are now being given unlimited access to taxpayer funds.  Why “unlimited” bailout funds?  And worse is the Administration’s unknowing and ambivalent response as to future bailouts: “we sure hope not.” This is Viet Nam war thinking applied to the current financial crisis: “We are so far into the bailout now, how can we stop?”

Harbingers of Social Mood

Issac Newton theorized: “to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.”   Societies function because a broad consensus agrees upon accepted modes of behavior.  Importantly, these behaviors are mostly voluntary rather than state coerced.  The best example in the United States is the payment of taxes, as we have a largely voluntary compliance system, as the IRS cannot audit everyone. Two recent examples rips in the social fabric have appeared:

  • Shoplifting – Father Tim Jones, a parish priest in York, England, encouraged the poor among his congregation to shoplift to feed their families:

‘My advice, as a Christian priest, is to shoplift,’ he said. ‘I do not offer such advice because I think that stealing is a good thing, or because I think it is harmless, for it is neither.’

But he said it was less harmful that prostitution, burglary, or robbery; he further said that the desperate should target large stores rather than small businesses, and take nothing they do not need. He wasn’t, I think, trying to set off a crime wave in his native York. If he resembled any other thoughtful vicar I have known, he was just trying to dramatise the plight of the local, unglamorous poor for a congregation which might prefer the objects of his charity to be on another continent.  See The Guardian

  • Jingle Mail – Jingle mail is the new jargon describing a homeowner’s strategic default and abandonment of his home, in essence mailing his keys back to the bank. Much has been written about mortgage foreclosures.  For 2009 experts project 4.5 million mortgage foreclosures, with 1.5 million of these foreclosures from strategic defaulters.   When a homeowner realizes that the value of his house is significantly below the amount of the mortgage, walking away may be the best financial option.  This strategy would be even more appealing in non-recourse states like California. See Richard Benson, “Jingle Mail, Jingle Mail

Consequences

Americans will not idly watch without reaction the bailout of private corporations at taxpayer expense.  The preferred reaction would be through electoral changes in November.  But even electoral changes can be subverted through lobbying and financial clout of big, politically connected corporations.  And neither Republicans nor Democrats are immunized against the lobbying disease. Just examine the bi-partisan lobbying of insurance, pharmaceutical companies and financial companies in the health care and financial reform debates.

Hopelessness forces individuals to undertake self-help remedies. Today it is jingle mail and shoplifting.  Tomorrow it could be refusals to pay taxes or credit card bills.  Perpetual institutional bailouts can only be a path to further rips in the social fabric and ultimately to, anarchy.

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11
Sep 09

Can You Invest in the US Equity Markets?

In the past there were investment benchmarks that a serious investor could examine before making a decision on what stock to buy.  Classic fundamental benchmarks were discounted cash flow, free cash flow, price earnings ratio, book value and other value determining measures.   Technically-oriented investors could examine 50 and 200 day moving averages, support and resistance lines, short sales coverage ratios, accumulation and distribution patterns among a myriad of indicators.  That was the world that existed pre-autumn 2008.  Then the new “Save the World” trio of Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner took unprecedented steps of direct government intervention to pick stock market winners and losers.  Add the Obama administration’s aggressive interventional programs such as healthcare, unionization and energy. We have now transformed from a free market economy where companies rise and fall on their business acumen to a state dominated economy where success is determined by political acumen.

We have turned classical economics on its head.  In the market place, weak companies with political connections are saved and efficient companies are punished.  I will return to the punishing of efficient companies later in this posting.

Much has been written about the financial industry.  But examine the automobile industry and the unprecedented level of government intervention.  The government has demonstrated that it will stop at nothing to “save” the Big Three American automakers and their union jobs. First, at the expense of creditors, government has intervened in the bankruptcy process to ram through pre-packaged bankruptcies and reorganizations.   Government now appoints management and favors unions.  It also guarantees new loans so these companies can borrow at favorable interest rates.

With the government firmly entrenched in the car business why not have a cash for clunkers program?  Demand is artificially stimulated for a short period of time under the guise of better gas efficiency and economic stimulation.  A few obvious flaws with this program:  1) we may have merely shifted future demand to the present with an almost certain drop in future demand; 2) politically we cannot limit the program to the Big Three since many of the most fuel efficient cars are foreign made by companies such as Toyota and Honda, thereby adding to our trade deficit; 3) many of the “clunkers” were probably quite serviceable vehicles and owned outright with no debt. Instead, we have induced consumers to take on more debt and 4) if we are truly interested in fuel efficiency why are encouraging an auto-centric, long commute, shopping mall culture when mass transit is woefully inadequate.

I have only picked one set of companies, the US Big Three, but this type of interventional behavior knows no bounds: GE, AIG, money center banks, credit card companies, builders, airlines, money market funds and the list is virtually endless.   All an industry needs is a good lobbyist, some union support or an “End of the World” story and the government coffers are emptied. It beats the hard work of developing new products and services, funding these new products and services, marketing, billing and collecting that real world companies face without government intervention.  The efficient company must compete in the capital markets for scarce capital with these government supported enterprises.  The efficient company must pay more for such capital, which is the lifeblood of the business, which ultimately is reflected in product and service pricing, profit margins and ultimately stock market valuation.

As we go forward, technical and fundamental analysis is probably useless.  What is needed is a bona fide political analyst to help with the next company to be showered with government largess.   Perhaps we need a new index – Government Owned and Dominated 500 – the Deity index.  There must be an investment bank (with assistance from the Treasury) already cobbling together an exchange traded fund.  I would submit it is near impossible to safely invest in the US equity markets when the playing field has shifted from economics to politics.

Note -Nothing in this post or blog constitutes investment advice.  Consult your own investment adviser for such advice.

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